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THE CASE OF DETAINEES TORTURED1 IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND THE “WAR ON TERROR:” ARE THEY ENTITLED TO REPARATIONS? 
 
Julie Dubé Gagnon* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Between 2001 and 2009, the United States of America (U.S.) allegedly 
committed acts of torture initiated at high levels of the government and carried 
out by the U.S. military, the CIA, and private contractors in territories under 
U.S. control (Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan), in secret prisons abroad 
allowed by a policy of extraordinary renditions. The grand majority of the 
torture victims are not U.S. citizens, nor residents of this country. This paper 
concludes that the alleged victims of torture have a right to reparations under 
international human rights law and that the U.S.’s responses to such allegations 
thus far do not comply with the requirements of the laws. In conclusion, this 
paper recommends what more should be done in order for the U.S. to comply 
with international norms regarding reparations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 7, 2011, the Obama Administration announced that it had 
ordered the Department of Defense to lift a stay on new charges in military 
commissions.2 Obama’s decision to “look forward, not back” presents urgent 
and crying impunity dilemmas to hold accountable those responsible for a 
policy of torture [of detainees] conducted during President Bush’s war on 
terror. In fact, to date the Obama Administration has failed to investigate the 
crimes which amount to human rights violations committed during the reign of 
                                                        
1
 Torture, for the purposes of this paper, also includes other cruel and inhuman and 
degrading treatment. 
*
 LL.M. candidate 2011, International Human Rights Law, University of Notre Dame Law 
School, Center for Civil and Human Rights; B.A. (McGill), LL.B. (Université du Québec à 
Montréal).  Thanks to Patrica Tarre Moser for her comments and assistance with this article. 
2
 See Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama Clears Way to Guantanamo Trials, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/world/americas/08guantanamo.html. 
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his predecessor even though President Obama himself condemned the use of 
torture in questioning detainees.3 To redeem itself, the U.S. must take action to 
hold accountable those who promoted a policy of torture and those who 
practiced it. But a question remains: how exactly should the U.S. respond to 
allegations of torture committed after 9/11 during the Bush Administration? 
The main forms of accountability for gross violations of human rights reflect 
internationally recognized rights to truth, justice, and reparations.4 Attempting 
to answer the previous question, this paper focuses on the third pillar of the 
accountability framework and argues that in order to obtain justice, the victims 
of torture need to receive reparations from the U.S. government. To this end, 
Part I presents a context for the torture allegations, defines who the torture 
victims are, and establishes that a particular interrogation technique, water-
boarding, constitutes torture. Part II briefly presents the truth, justice, and 
reparations accountability legal framework under international law and 
discusses the legal obligations of the U.S. under the third pillar of this 
framework in order to offer redress to torture victims. Part III presents the 
unsatisfactory current position of the U.S., insofar as it has not offered any 
kind of remedy to the alleged torture victims, and how this stance does not 
comply with international norms. Part IV, subsequent to analyzing how the 
responses to the allegations of torture amount to breaches of international 
obligations, stresses what more should be done and recommends a few 
practical measures the U.S. should implement in order to satisfy the 
requirements of the law.  
This paper argues that in order to discharge some of its international 
obligations in relation to victims’ rights to reparation and to a larger extent, to 
truth, the U.S. needs to create a program for reparations.5 Without a 
mechanism for truth-telling, victims may feel that reparations are easy pay-offs 
in exchange for their silence. On the other hand, without reparations victims 
could feel that truth telling is an empty exercise which will not materially 
affect their lives.6 However, this paper focuses on attempting to define what 
the ideal reparation program should look like from a victim-centered 
perspective. Although these recommendations might be politically difficult to 
                                                        
3
 See Comm. Against Torture, Legal Subcomm., Rep. on its 36th Sess., May 19, 2006, ¶ 22, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006).  
4
 See generally G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147, (Mar. 21, 2006); H.R. Res. 
2005/8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/81 (Apr. 21, 2005); Comm. On Human Rights, U.N. 
ESCOR. Rep. on its 61st Sess., Apr. 18, 2005, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102 (Feb. 18, 2005).  
5
 This paper assumes that the truth commission will recommend a reparations program. For a 
full analysis of what kind of truth commission should be implemented in the case of the U.S. 
allegations of torture, see generally Morgane Landel, Proposals for a Truth Commission and 
Reparations Program for Victims of Torture by US Forces Since 9/11, 16(1) ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 115 (2009); Kim D. Chanbonpin, “We Don’t Want Dollars, Just Change”: Narrative 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, An Inclusive Model For Social Healing, And The Truth About 
Torture Commission, 6 NW J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 1 (2011). 
6
 See Landel, supra note 5, at 117. 
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achieve, the victims of the U.S. policy against terror are neither residents nor 
citizens of the U.S. and as such have no political power in this country.7  
After briefly demonstrating that an interrogation technique (water-
boarding) used by U.S. officials amounts to torture or cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment as prohibited by the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),8 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),9 it will be 
assumed that these acts were committed in some instances and that the U.S. is 
in violation of its international obligations to refrain from such acts. Since the 
focus of this paper is the duty to repair under international law, when it refers 
to torture, it also includes the use of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 
 
I. CONTEXT, ALLEGATIONS, WHO WERE TORTURED AND WAS IT 
REALLY TORTURE? 
 
First they cuffed me with my arms in front of my legs. After 
approximately half an hour they cuffed me with my arms behind my 
legs. After another half hour they forced me onto my knees, and 
cuffed my hands behind my legs. Later still, they forced me on my 
stomach, bent my knees, and cuffed my hands and feet together. At 
some point, I urinated on the floor and on myself. Military police 
poured pine oil on the floor and on me, and then, with me lying on my 
stomach and my hands and feet cuffed together behind me, the 
military police dragged me back and forth through the mixture of 
urine and pine oil on the floor. Later, I was put back in my cell, 
without being allowed a shower or a change of clothes. I was not 
given a change of clothes for two days. They did this to me again a 
few weeks later.10 
 
Canadian national Omar Khadr is not the only detainee in the custody 
of the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay who denounced such shocking treatment.  
                                                        
7
 Id. 
8
 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. I § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].  Art. 1 of the CAT 
states: “For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act 
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” Id. 
9
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171.  “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” 
10
 Aff. Of Omar Ahmed Khadr, ¶ 59 (Feb. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.michelleshephard.ca/docs/Affidavit_Khadr_Redacted_2008.pdf (taken by defense 
attorney while detained at Guantanamo Bay). 
160 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 2011 
 160  
Between 2001 and 2009, the U.S. allegedly committed acts of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment initiated at high levels of the 
government carried out by the U.S. military, the CIA, and private contractors 
in territories under U.S. control (Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan), in 
secret prisons abroad called “black sites” which are allowed by a policy of 
extraordinary renditions.11 It is believed that there have been about eleven 
secret detention sites since September 2001 in various countries including six 
in the three countries listed above.12 It is estimated that this seven-year 
program under the Bush Administration involved 150,000 to 200,000 persons, 
some 800 of whom were held in Guantanamo, and resulted in over 100 
deaths.13 It has been proved that some of the tortured detainees under this 
program had no connection to terrorism and had been released due to wrongful 
imprisonment.14  
The incidences of torture and ill-treatment committed in the above-
mentioned detention centers have included beatings, deprivations of basic 
necessities, water-boarding, isolation, use of stress positions, forced nudity, 
and use of extreme temperatures to only mention a few.15 These practices have 
been publicly reported, deplored, and denounced by a vast array of 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.16 Commentators have 
argued that a close examination of what occurred reveals a policy concealed 
under different labels and widespread and systematic practices that could not 
have been the work of a few individuals.17 According to a commentator, the 
acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment committed in 
                                                        
11
 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE BY THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION: IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? xi (2010).  
12
 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BY THE NUMBERS: FINDINGS OF THE DETAINEE 
ABUSE AND ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, 
(2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/06425-etn-by-
the-numbers.pdf. 
13
 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at ix.  
14
 See Press Release, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Transfers Three 
Guantanamo Bay Detainees to Albania, (Feb. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-ag-186.html. 
15
 See e.g. Morgane Landel, Proposals for a Truth Commission and Reparations Program 
for Victims of Torture by US Forces Since 9/11, 16(1) ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115 (2009); 
Kim D. Chanbonpin, “We Don’t Want Dollars, Just Change”: Narrative Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, An Inclusive Model For Social Healing, And The Truth About Torture Commission, 6 
NW J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 1, 22 (2011); for a complete list of interrogation techniques amounting 
in torture, see PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN LIVES 4, 9 (June 
2008), available at http://brokenlives.info/?page_id=69. 
16
 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 5.  The organizations include the United Nations, the 
European Parliament, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, 
Human Rights First, Amnesty International, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Other 
reports originate from military Judge Advocates General and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy who opposed them as violating the Constitution, U.S. laws in Title 10 and Title 18 
U.S.C., international humanitarian law and the CAT. 
17
 See CAROLYN PATTY BLUM, LISA MAGARRELL, & MARIEKE WIERDA, PROSECUTING 
ABUSES OF DETAINEES IN US COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS 21, 23 (2009), available at 
http://www.ictj.org/static/Publications/ICTJ_USA_CriminalJustCriminalPolicy_pb2009.pdf. 
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Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other secret detention centers as part 
of the CIA extraordinary rendition program are a pattern of illegal practices 
that clearly reflect a policy.18 The state policy did not limit itself to inflicting 
torture on detainees—it also included a pattern of concealment and 
obfuscation, whose apparent design was to create a puzzled amount of legal 
memoranda (Torture Memos),19 including Presidential Executive Orders 
concerning interrogation methods by the CIA and the U.S. military.20  
But who exactly are the victims? They are alleged terrorists or proven 
terrorists, neither residents nor citizens of the U.S.  For instance, Maher Arar, a 
Canadian engineer, was erroneously suspected of being a terrorist by the 
Canadian federal police. He was unlawfully arrested and sent to Syria by the 
U.S. where he was imprisoned and tortured. The Canadian government 
exonerated him and paid him more than 10 million Canadian dollars in 
compensation after a two-year inquiry.21 But on June 14, 2010, the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied Arar’s petition for certiorari to review the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals en banc decision dismissing his case,22 ending his 
chances before U.S. courts. He will never receive compensation by the U.S. 
government through judicial means.23  
Without analyzing every interrogation technique employed by U.S. 
officials, the answer to the question, whether the detainees were really tortured, 
is most likely to be positive. This postulation is based on the various reports 
and legal literature previously cited, the United Nation’s (U.N.) assessment of 
U.S. practices,24 and the the appraisal of the U.S. regarding the meaning of 
torture perpetrated by other states.25 In addition, following the Abu Ghraib 
                                                        
18
 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE BY THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION: IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? 3 (2010). 
19
 See e.g. the memorandum of from Alberto R. Gonzales on the Decision Re Application of 
the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  
Memo 7. January 25, 2002, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen 
Greenberg, Joshue Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Memo 7]. Attorney General John Ashcroft is 
responsible for a series of Justice Department memoranda that allowed the Department of 
Defense to circumvent domestic and international law and facilitated acts of torture. Alberto 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, also issued a January 25, 2002, memorandum to President 
Bush urging the Bush Administration to declare captives exempt from the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions in order to pre-empt war crimes charges and justify the denial of rights 
and more extreme forms of interrogation. Id.  This memorandum provided a presumed legal 
basis for the abuses in Guantanamo and Afghanistan, and, through General Miller's advice and 
actions, in Iraq. See also Katherine Gallagher, Efforts to Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other 
High-Level United States Officials Accountable for Torture, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1087, 1091-
93 (2009). 
20
 See BASSIOUINI, supra note 18, at 3. 
21
 See id. at xvi–xvii. 
22
 See generally Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).  
23
 Id. 
24
 See Comm. Against Torture, Legal Subcomm., Rep. on its 36th Sess., May 19, 2006, ¶ 
13–28, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006).. 
25
 See U.S. State Department, Iran: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005, ¶ 6 
(2006),  available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61688.htm. 
162 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 2011 
 162  
torture scandal, which broke in mid-2004, the leaked International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) report,26 and the accounts of the released detainees 
detailed numerous incidents of detainees being repeatedly beaten with various 
objects; kept naked and shackled in dark cells; subjected to sensory 
deprivation; subjected to food, water and sleep deprivation; being exposed to 
loud music or extreme temperatures for prolonged periods of time; and various 
acts of humiliation including forcing naked, male detainees to stand against a 
wall with women’s underwear on their head.27 Indeed, the ICRC established 
that “[p]ersons deprived of their liberty [in U.S.-run detention facilities in Iraq] 
face the risk of being subjected to a process of physical and psychological 
coercion in some cases tantamount to torture.”28 
 For the purposes of this paper, the right of the victim to receive 
reparations is triggered by the demonstration that a human rights violation 
(“torture”) was committed. Because the demonstration of all interrogation 
techniques would not be possible during this study, this paper focuses on how 
water-boarding, as a permitted technique under the torture memos, constituted 
torture. This does not mean that other interrogation techniques do not amount 
to torture. 
The most notorious of the torture memos is dated August 1, 2002. The 
memo examines the legality under international law of interrogation methods 
to be used on “captured Al Qaeda operatives.”29 The Memo redefines torture 
and the obligations of the U.S. under international law.30  Specifically, under 
this Memo, both the physical and mental thresholds for torture were 
heightened: physical pain “[m]ust be equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of 
bodily function, or even death,” while mental pain “[m]ust result in significant 
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g. lasting for months or even 
years.”31 The memo also includes a section on defenses, in which it is stated 
that “[u]nder the current circumstances certain justification defenses might be 
available that would potentially eliminate criminal liability [for one charged 
under the Torture Statute].”32 The fact that Article 2(2) of the CAT provides 
                                                        
26
 See generally Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Report by the ICRC On the Coalition Forces’ 
Treatment of Persons Held in Iraq (Feb. 2004), 
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5yrl67.html.  
27
 See generally PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN LIVES 4, 9 (June 
2008), available at http://brokenlives.info/?page_id=69.  
28
 See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, supra note 26, at ¶ 59. 
29
 For the text of the Aug. 1 Memo see Memo 14. August 1, 2002, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: 
THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen Greenberg, Joshue Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter 
Memo 14]. This compilation also includes many of the notorious Memos. 
30
 SeeKatherine Gallagher, Efforts to Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other High-Level United 
States Officials Accountable for Torture, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1087, 1091 (2009).  
31
 SeeMemo 14, supra note 29, at 196. 
32
 Id. at 207. 
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that there can be no exception to the prohibition against torture is dealt with 
only in a footnote.33 
Based on the legal advice contained in this memo, a list of interrogation 
techniques was developed for use on detainees captured in the so-called ‘war 
on terror.’ On  December 2, 2002, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
approved interrogation techniques that included: (1) attention grasps, (2) 
wailings, (3) facial holds, (4) facial slaps, (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall 
standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a 
confinement box, and (10) water-boarding.34  
Water-boarding is a form of “mock” drowning.35 It consists of 
strapping down an individual to a board and positioning the board in a way that 
puts the individual’s head lower than the chest.  Then, a towel is placed over 
the mouth and nose, and water is poured on the cloth.36 As the towel soaks, 
water starts passing through the individual’s nose and/or mouth.37  
The Bush Administration argued that water-boarding is simulated 
drowning.38 On the other hand, journalist Christopher Hitcher, who decided to 
be subjected to water-boarding, stated that it is not “simulated”: “[y]ou feel 
that you are drowning because you are drowning—or, rather, being drowned, 
albeit slowly and under controlled conditions and at the mercy (or otherwise) 
of those who are applying the pressure.”39 
Physicians for Human Rights studied the effects of water-boarding.40 
They concluded that it causes a “shortage of oxygen in the body,” which 
provokes “tachycardia (rapid heartbeat), hyperventilation (rapid respiratory 
rate), and labored breathing (airway obstruction and breathlessness), [which] is 
almost unavoidable.”41 As a consequence, the technique could “[i]nduce the 
obstruction of blood flow to the heart (cardiac ischemia) or irregular heart beat 
(arrhythmia) in vulnerable individuals. Brief oxygen deprivation can cause 
                                                        
33
 See Gallagher, supra note 30, at 1092; Article 2(2) of the CAT reads: “No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
34
  See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE BY THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION: IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? 22 (2010); Memo 14, supra note 29, at 196–199. 
35
 See generally Physicians for Human Rights, Leave No Marks: Enhanced Interrogation 
Techniques and the Risk of Criminality, 17 (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org. 
36
 See Christopher Hitcher, Believe Me, It is Torture, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2008), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/08/hitchens200808 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2011). 
37
 Id.  
38
 See generally Mark Tran, Cheney Endorses Simulated Drowning, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 
27, 2006), available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/27/usa.guantanamo.  
39
 Hitcher, supra note 36.  
40
 Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 35, at 17; See also, Evan Wallach, Drop by 
Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
468, 475-76 (2007).  
41
 Id. at 475–76.  
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neurological damage.”42 Additionally, Physicians for Human Rights argued 
that water-boarding “[c]an also cause severe psychological harm,” which can 
constitute torture.43 Furthermore, the water-boarding experience is 
“[a]ssociated with the development of predominantly respiratory panic attacks, 
high levels of depressive symptoms, and prolonged posttraumatic stress 
disorder.”44 Even Christopher Hitcher, who voluntarily subjected himself to the 
treatment and could stop it at any point, had some psychological 
consequences.45 Finally, it is necessary to point out that key prisoners were 
subjected to water-boarding dozens and sometimes hundreds of times.46 
Water-boarding is a technique that has been previously condemned by 
the United States.47 After the Second World War, military courts prosecuted 
Japanese interrogators as war criminals using this technique.48 It has also been 
recognized as torture by civil courts,49 as well as by a criminal court in 
Texas.50 Additionally, as recent as 2006, the State Department considered 
water-boarding torture in its Iran Country Report.51  
According to these findings and considering the severe physical and 
mental consequences that water-boarding produces, it would fall within the 
narrow and distorted definition of torture adopted by the 2002 Memo. Even so, 
internationally, the Committee against Torture has considered water-boarding 
torture.52 A similar conclusion emanated from the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while 
Countering Terrorism,53 and other respected scholars.54 Therefore, this paper 
will also take the position that water-boarding amounts to torture. Having 
                                                        
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 See Christopher Hitcher, Believe Me, It is Torture, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2008), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/08/hitchens200808 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2011). 
46
 Scott Shane, 2 Suspects Waterboarded 266 Times, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/21/world/21detain.htm. 
47
 See Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 
45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468, 475–76 (2007), for a comprehensive analysis. 
48
 Id. at 477–82. 
49
 See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1996). 
50
 See United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984). 
51
 See U.S. State Department, Iran: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005, ¶ 6 
(2006),  available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61688.htm.  
52
 Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under 
Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against 
Torture to the United States, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006). 
53
 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 
Addendum Mission to the United States of America, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3 (Nov. 
22, 2007) (by Martin Scheinin). 
54
 See Scott Horton, Military Necessity, Torture, and the Criminality of Lawyers, in 
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 169, 181 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al 
eds., Springer 2006); Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in 
U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 506 (2007). 
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contextualized the allegations, identified the victims, and demonstrated the 
commission of torture in the case of water-boarding, the next section considers 
the legal obligations of the United States under international law in order to 
remedy such unlawful acts.  
 
II. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
FOR REPARATIONS OF ACTS OF TORTURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
International human rights law speaks of three fundamental rights of 
victims: the right to know, the right to justice, and the right to reparation.55 In a 
nutshell, the right to know includes the right to the truth and the obligation to 
keep alive the memory of what occurred. The initial phase for acquiring truth 
can result in the creation of an extrajudicial commission of inquiry and taking 
prompt action in order to ascertain the preservation and access to archives of 
the period of violations.56 The right to justice, for its part, means that measures 
are taken to fight impunity. Finally, the right to reparations are individualized 
actions implemented with the aim of granting reparations including restitution, 
compensation, and rehabilitation. The right to reparations also entails 
collective measures of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.57  This 
paper therefore focuses on the third pillar of the accountability framework for 
human rights violations in international law: reparations.  
Reparations are intended to return the victim to the position in which he 
or she would have been if the violation had not occurred.58  Roht-Arriaza 
argues that this restitution in kind is impossible to achieve.59  Indeed, it is 
difficult to conceive of restoring life or a peaceful mental state when gross 
human rights violations have been committed.  Because restitution in integrum 
is practically impossible, human rights lawyers can nonetheless work at 
obtaining reparations for the body to enable survival (material reparations) and 
reparations for the spirit to acquire a sense of justice and a safe decorum for 
generations to come (moral damages).60  Roth-Arriaza stresses that reparations 
in the context of international law include restitution,61 which coincides with 
the concept of material reparations above. Reparations can also offer 
compensation, which refers to a payment for a harm suffered, or rehabilitation, 
                                                        
55
 See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of 
Principles to Combat Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102 (Feb. 18, 2005) (by Diane 
Orentlicher). 
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 See Dinah Shelton, The Right to Reparations for Acts of Torture: What Right, What 
Remedies?, 17(2) TORTURE J. 96, 103 n.31 (2007), available at 
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 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 157, 158 (2004). 
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which involves practical measures such as medical and psychological care.62 
Reparations can also take the form of satisfaction, truth-telling, and guarantees 
of non-repetition, which usually involves ending the violation.63 According to 
Redress, an acclaimed non-governmental organization that advocates for the 
rights of torture victims, reparations will have a significant impact since most 
survivors will have suffered severe physical and psychological trauma, 
possible upheaval, and drastic change of circumstances.64  The process of 
healing will normally require the survivor of torture to come to terms with his 
or her traumatic past.  Obtaining closure for the events of the past may 
facilitate psychological recovery and instill greater confidence and a sense of 
the future, thereby contributing to the overall integration and healing process.65  
Despite the horrific human reality underlying acts of torture, a 
fundamental legal question remains: does a state (notably by the actions of his 
officials or employees individually), under international human rights law, 
incur civil liability towards victims of human rights violations? If such liability 
exists—meaning that the obligation to repair a wrong done by the state with 
monetary compensation—does the victim have a procedural right to enforce 
the liability? If such norms under international human rights law oblige states 
to repair, what are the specific legal responsibilities of the United States 
regarding this matter? 
There are divergent opinions on whether or not there is an obligation on 
the part of the state under international law to provide reparations for 
individual victims of human rights violations, such as torture.66 It has been 
argued that there is no norm of customary international law under which 
individuals are entitled to reparations because there is no specific duty to 
provide individual reparations in any human rights treaty.67 Following the 
same paradigm, it has been argued that the number of victims who actually 
receive compensation and reparation for gross human rights violations is so 
minimal that it demonstrates that state practice does not follow the 
international norm of the right to reparations for individuals.68 On the other 
side of the spectrum, more positive commentators have contended that the 
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 Id.; see also Morgane Landel, Proposals for a Truth Commission and Reparations 
Program for Victims of Torture by US Forces Since 9/11, 16(1) ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 
132 (2009). 
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 See Special Rapporteur on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, princs. 19-23 Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (Jan. 18, 2000) (by M. Cherif Bassiouni). 
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 See The Redress Trust, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE 11 (April 2003), 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/AuditReportText.pdf. 
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Victims of Torture by US Forces Since 9/11, 16(1) ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 133 (2009). 
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J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157, 171–73 (2005). 
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obligation to bestow reparations now constitutes customary international law 
and thus permits victims a right to reparations for human rights violations 
perpetrated by the state.69  
The right to reparations is also accounted for in the laws of war,70 
which mainly concern inter-state obligations. However, under international law 
it is not clear if the global war on terror is an armed conflict, in which the laws 
of war would apply.71 Because of this ongoing debate,72 the right to reparations 
in this paper is studied following international human rights law obligations 
only.73  
Part of the answer to the question raised above, however pessimistic 
and imperfect for idealist minds, rests in the preamble of the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law74 (“Basic Principles”), which state that they “[d]o not entail new 
international or domestic legal obligations” but reflect “[e]xisting legal 
obligations under international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law” of states. Although the third sentence in Principle 15 speaks 
of a duty of states to provide reparation,75 this proposition is decisively 
weakened by the introductory phrase: “[i]n accordance with its domestic laws 
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 See Bardo Fassbender, Can Victims Sue State Officials for Torture?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 347, 357–58 (2008); Jordan J. Paust, Accountability for the Torture memo: Civil Liability 
of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel and Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and Forced 
Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L., 359, 365–67 (2009), for a discussion of the 
applicability of the laws of war for torture victims seeking redress. 
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 See Special Rapporteur on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, princs. Preamble, ¶ 7  Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (Jan. 18, 2000) (by M. Cherif Bassiouni) 
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 See Fassbender, supra note 73, at 357; Principle 15 reads: “[a] state shall provide 
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and international legal obligations.”76  Commentators such as Tomuschat have 
noted that this clearly indicates:   
 
[n]o general obligation is deemed to enjoin states to make reparation, 
but that such commitment can only be derived from additional 
sources, either from national law or from principles and rules of 
international law which need to be indentified specifically in any case 
at hand.77  
 
Likewise, Principle 11 of the Basic Principles qualifies the language that a 
victim has a right to “adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm 
suffered” preceeded by “as provided for under international law.”78 To add to 
the weakness of that statement, Principle 18 uses the word “should” instead of 
a harder “shall.”79 In light of the aforementioned, it appears that no general 
firm obligation under the Basic Principles exists upon states to make 
reparation. This soft law document nonetheless demonstrates a tendency and 
desire of the international legal community to allocate such redress to victims 
of gross human rights violations. 
Even if the weight of the Basic Principles is deceiving, it is pertinent to 
explore the duty to repair in cases of torture in other legal instruments. Indeed, 
a vast range of international normative laws assure the right to fair redress for 
victims of torture, including means for rehabilitation. As such, article 14 of the 
CAT reads: 
 
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an 
act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and 
adequate compensation including the means for as full rehabilitation 
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as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act 
of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.80  
 
The United States ratified the CAT in 1994 but has provided reservations 
stating that articles 1 through 16, including article 14 stated above, are not 
“self-executing.”81 However, according to Paust, the reservation expressed by 
the United States in 1994 is valueless because both sentences of article 14 
quoted above contain a duty phrased by a mandatory “shall” language that 
provides clarity regarding the immediate mandatory duty, and that is typically 
self-executing.82 
In addition, the Committee against Torture has stated that the United 
States “[s]hould recognize and ensure that the Convention applies at all times, 
whether in peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.”83 It also expressed that the United States should “[e]nsure . . . that 
mechanisms to obtain full redress, compensation and rehabilitation are 
accessible to all victims of acts of torture or abuse, including sexual violence, 
perpetrated by its officials.”84 In addition, the Committee stated that states 
should enact appropriate legislation to “render application for compensation 
viable.”85  
On his part, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms stated in 1996 that “[s]tates have a duty to adopt 
special measures, where necessary, to permit expeditious and fully effective 
reparations.”86 One year later, the U.N. General Assembly reiterated the 
principle that states are responsible for providing reparations for victims of 
gross violations of international human rights law which can be attributed 
either to action or omission by the state.87  
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Other treaty-based duties of states exist regarding rights of individuals 
to an effective remedy, access to courts, and nonimmunity with respect to 
torture. Prominent among these are the right to a remedy,88 enshrined in article 
2 paragraph 3(a) of the ICCPR, which obliges each state party “[t]o ensure that 
any person whose rights or freedoms are herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy.”89 Articles 9(5) and 14(6) add that anyone 
unlawfully arrested, detained, or convicted shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation or be compensated according to law. Unfortunately, the Human 
Rights Committee has not interpreted “effective remedy” as encompassing 
compensation: “[t]he Human Rights Committee does not recognize any firm 
rule on reparation . . . In particular, compensation is not seen as an integral 
element of reparation.”90  Nonetheless, article 50 of the ICCPR further 
mandates that all of the “[p]rovisions of the present Covenant shall extend to 
all parts of the federal States without any limitations or exceptions.”91 Paust 
argues that this provision assures that rights and duties under the treaty apply 
with respect to the decisions and conduct in Washington D.C. as well as in 
judicial proceedings within the U.S. in which claims to fair compensation 
proceed.92 
The rights to an effective remedy and access to courts are also reflected 
in article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,93 which, following 
the opinion of Paust, mirrors patterns of generally shared expectations 
concerning customary roots of the right to an effective remedy in domestic 
courts for violations of human rights.94 Rights to an effective remedy and 
access to courts are also necessarily part of the U.N. Charter-based obligations 
of all members to assure “[u]niversal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights.”95  
In the Inter-American System, the principles for reparations are 
enshrined in article 63 of the American Convention, which states that the court 
is entitled to decide that “[t]he consequences of the measure or situation that 
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constituted the breach of such right or freedom are remedied and that fair 
compensation is paid to the injured party.”96 Article 25 of the American 
Convention goes further, entitling everyone to effective recourse for protection 
against acts that violate the fundamental rights recognized by the constitution 
“[o]r laws of the state or by the Convention,” even where the act is committed 
by persons acting in the course of their official duties.97 The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has expressed in Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras 
that “[e]very violation of an international obligation which results in harm 
creates a duty to make adequate reparation.”98  
Although the U.S. has not ratified the American Convention, within the 
U.S., at Guantanamo, and elsewhere in the Americas, the U.S. is bound to take 
no action inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.99 
According to Paust, such actions would necessarily include orders, 
authorizations, complicity, and other acts in violation of the human rights to 
freedom from torture and the right to “fair compensation” protected in the 
American Convention.100 It could be argued following the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties that the obligation arises because the U.S. signed the 
treaty in 1977 while awaiting ratification.101 The U.S. is also bound by the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man102 (American 
Declaration), which affirms that “[e]very individual who has been deprived of 
his liberty … has the right to humane treatment” and “[e]very person may 
resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights.”103 
From the foregoing, it could be argued that at present neither a rule of 
customary international law nor a treaty rule directly obliges a U.S. court to 
financially compensate victims of torture. However, it is clearly accepted in 
international law that the right to a remedy comprises two aspects: on the one 
hand, the procedural right of access to justice and, on the other hand, the 
substantive right to redress for injury suffered because of an act or acts 
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committed in violation of rights contained in national or international law.104 In 
addition, the obligation to offer a remedy by the state itself for a violation of an 
obligation is omnipresent in the legal instruments, be they soft law, customary 
international law, or treaty law. It is in this respect unquestionable that an 
emerging norm that obliges states—including the U.S.—to offer reparations to 
victims of torture, exists and it is on this premise that this paper will address 
the non-compliance of the U.S. with this duty.105 
 
III. WHAT HAS THE UNITED STATES DONE SO FAR IN TERMS OF 
REPARATIONS, AND HOW ITS RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS DOES NOT 
MEET INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
 
The U.S. has not created any administrative mechanism to offer redress 
to victims of torture.  Victims have attempted to find remedy through U.S. 
courts, but to date none have received compensation, although some cases are 
still to be decided.106 This section briefly exposes how the civil immunity of 
U.S. officials for torture hinders victims’ right to reparations. The current state 
of the law and the government’s inactions violate the CAT’s, ICCPR’s, and 
international obligations to offer a remedy. To this end, it is argued that the 
U.S. violates international human rights law by not providing reparations to 
victims seeking legal redress before domestic courts and by the same fashion 
not permitting access to courts.  
The U.S. has commissioned a number of reports to investigate 
allegations of torture. On May  25, 2004, then Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld directed the Naval Inspector General, Vice Admiral Albert T. 
Church III, to conduct a comprehensive review of Department of Defense 
interrogation operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo.107 Also in 
2004, an investigation was ordered into allegations of abuse by members of the 
800th Military Police Brigade, including the abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison.108 
This report did not recommend that anyone be held criminally accountable. It 
did, however, recommend that various members of the army be reprimanded 
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and various institutional reforms be implemented.109 Human Rights First, 
among other important non-governmental organizations, reported that there 
had been around 600 criminal investigations into allegations of detainee 
abuse.110 Despite investigation efforts, impunity prevails and the victims’ 
needs stay in the shadow. For example, at Abu Ghraib, it was found that the 
chain of command and military leaders had failed to properly supervise 
soldiers and issue guidance about detention and interrogation policies.111 
However, despite this modest effort, most of these investigations have not 
centered on victims, and to date no reparation mechanism has been 
implemented to address the needs of the torture victims.  
As Roht-Arriaza points out, national courts can serve as the first 
opportunity for reparations in cases of human rights violations.112 In fact, 
because of the inability of the government to properly address allegations of 
torture, victims have begun to sue before domestic courts. But a problem 
remains: U.S. officials cannot be held civilly liable under current domestic 
U.S. law. Therefore, no damages have been ordered to victims.113  
In theory, victims are able to claim reparations under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), which permits aliens to demand civil remedies in district courts 
for a tort “[c]ommitted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”114 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the court held that torture is a 
crime amounting to a violation of the law of nations and is therefore actionable 
under the ATS.115 At first hand, it appears that it would be possible for victims 
tortured by U.S. agents to bring civil claims against the persons involved, 
provided that they are in the U.S. and that the court can assert personal 
jurisdiction over them.116 Unfortunately, this theory has been tried in practice, 
and the U.S. government has repeatedly substituted itself for the defendants 
and invoked state secrecy or argued immunity for actions of individuals,117 
consequently blocking any recourse claimants could have. This Department of 
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Justice (DOJ) litigation strategy has prevented all victims of abusive 
counterterrorism practices so far from obtaining compensation injuries.118 
Following this trend, the courts apply what has been held in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, which bestows qualified immunity to government employees, 
exempting them “[f]rom liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”119 Under Boumediene v. Bush, the US 
Constitution does not grant rights to aliens outside U.S. jurisdiction,120 and “no 
one acting in an official capacity could ever be found liable under qualified 
immunity because under United States law they cannot be said to have violated 
statutory or constitutional rights.”121  
Article 14(1) of the CAT obliges the U.S. to “[e]nsure in its legal 
system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an 
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for 
as full rehabilitation as possible.”122 Upon ratification of the CAT, the U.S. 
articulated “[t]hat it is the understanding of the United States that article 14 
requires a State Party to provide a private right of action for damages only for 
acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that State 
party.”123 It is disbelieving that the U.S. complied with that obligation. In fact, 
the ATS provides a foreign citizen an enforceable right to compensation for an 
act of torture by a U.S. official or agent as a tort committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the U.S.124 None of the U.S. courts so far have 
reached the question whether the ATS applies to an act of torture possibly 
committed in Guantanamo or elsewhere.125 The ATS does not itself provide for 
any territorial limitation, as a violation of the law of nations can be committed 
anywhere in the world. However, for acts of torture, the US has expressly 
limited a private right of action for damages to acts committed “in territory 
under the jurisdiction” of the U.S.126 It was held, for instance, in Rasul v. 
Myers that Guantanamo is not a U.S. territory,127 but the Supreme Court 
disagreed and later said that it exercises “complete jurisdiction and control” 
over Guantanamo.128 The term “jurisdiction” referred to in article 2(1) of the 
CAT could cover any place over which a contracting party has effective 
control and authority. It is thus apparent that the ATS could find application 
for claims alleging torture at Guantanamo.129 
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As Fassbender contends, a further question arises when assessing the 
possibility of torture victims to sue for ATS violations before a domestic court. 
Indeed, which definition of “an act of torture” should be applicable for the 
victim to obtain redress and have a right to compensation according to article 
14(1) of the CAT?130 There is the possibility of employing the definition of the 
term “torture'” in article 1(1) of the CAT.131 Also, the reservations and 
understandings communicated by the U.S. when ratifying the CAT,132 restrict 
the scope of the definition of torture under article 1.133 These understandings 
are reflected in the definition of torture set forth in the Torture Victim 
Protection Act (TVPA),134 which contains the domestic definition of torture. In 
2005 and 2006, the U.S. declared that “[t]he definition of torture accepted by 
the U.S. upon ratification of the Convention and reflected in the understanding 
issued in its instrument of ratification remains unchanged.”135  
However, as mentioned earlier, since another reservation of the U.S. 
declared Articles 1–16 of the CAT to be not self-executing, according to 
Fassbender, the definition of Article 1 of the CAT “is not directly applicable 
by a U.S. court when deciding an ATS case.”136 Instead, a court would have to 
look at legislation implementing the CAT. According to the same author, with 
the exception of sections 2340 and 2340A of the U.S. Code, which criminalize 
acts of torture that occur outside the U.S.,137 it is argued that there is no such 
implementing legislation.138 In light of this brief assessment of the applicability 
of ATS and other domestic law remedies for torture victims, it is highly 
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unlikely that the current system will allow aliens to recover damages and 
reparations from those responsible in American courts.139 
Victims of torture are also incapable of getting their international 
human rights recognized by a domestic court and of being awarded appropriate 
damages if those rights have been violated. Part of the problem stems from 
legislation that was passed in 2006. The Military Commissions Act140 (MCA) 
bars alien “enemy combatants”,141 which includes current and former 
Guantanamo detainees, as well as others, from bringing suit in U.S. courts to 
challenge their treatment or to obtain damages for past mistreatment. This 
prohibition applies even to detainees who were brutally tortured and even in 
cases where U.S. officials have conceded error.142 Additionally, suits cannot be 
brought for violations of the Geneva Conventions because pursuant to the 
MCA, no one may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights in any 
civil action in a U.S. court against a current or former officer or agent of the 
U.S.143 
There are also more practical difficulties in pursuing reparations 
through the courts. Victims may not have access to lawyers,144 or there may be 
difficulty in presenting evidence of torture, as some forms of beatings and 
other violence often do not leave physical marks.145 As mentioned earlier, most 
victims are foreigners and find themselves to be powerless before the U.S. 
governmental.  A commentator points out that the victims “remain relatively or 
absolutely poor, are weak, and [are] dependent in some measure on the 
perpetrators for welfare and reparations.”146 
In light of the difficulties for the victims of torture to seek redress in 
domestic courts, it is uncertain under the circumstances whether the U.S. 
complies with its obligations under the ICCPR (ratified by the U.S. in 1992).147 
Article 2(3)(a) and (b) of the ICCPR provides that each state party to the 
Covenant undertake: 
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(a)  To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have 
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the 
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.148 
 
Thus, “a person who regards himself or herself as a victim of a 
violation of rights enshrined in the Covenant [ICCPR] shall have a right to 
have his or her claim determined by a competent authority of the respective 
state.”149 Article 13 of the CAT provides for a similar obligation.150 It is 
doubtful that the U.S. has so far complied with those provisions. For instance, 
in Rasul v. Myers,151 the Circiut Court evaded such a determination by 
referring the plaintiffs to the administrative remedies procedure under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),152 meaning that the plaintiffs needed to 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim before a civil court. 
The courts in Rasul v. Myers did not make use of the possibility of rendering a 
declaratory judgment, which constitutes another way under U.S. law to obtain 
damages.153 The lawyers of the plaintiffs in this case, the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, were not aware that the U.S. Department of Defense or 
the military departments could constitute a “competent authority,” as they must 
be clearly established following Article 2(3) of the ICCPR.154 
Even if torture victims can in theory claim reparations before domestic 
courts, it has been demonstrated that so far, this available remedy is virtually 
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impossible to obtain. The U.S. government, therefore, does not comply with its 
international obligations to offer reparations and must then create an 
administrative mechanism to ensure that victims have access to such redress.
  
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPARATION MECHANISMS WHICH WOULD 
ENABLE THE U.S. TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
 
 While reparations cannot “repair” harms caused by the U.S. 
counterterrorism policy, they are an important part of the accountability 
mechanisms to be instituted. Victims, even if they are or were alleged 
terrorists, are human beings and shall not be subjected to torture under any 
circumstances.  
As mentioned earlier, the tortured are neither American citizens nor 
residents and are most likely not on U.S. soil at the present time. It is therefore 
pertinent to note that historically, only one truth commission-like mechanism 
has ever been created for victims who were not citizens of the perpetrator 
country. The Tokyo Tribunal dealt with the issue of “comfort women” during 
the Second World War.155 Even if not many precedents exist in the world 
relating with this type of issue, this paper nevertheless advocates for the 
implementation of an independent reparations mechanism. 
 As discussed in part III, it is presently difficult if not impossible for 
torture victims to be offered reparations through U.S. courts. In order to 
remedy this situation, as suggested by the lawyers of Maher Arar, Congress 
should pass legislation to eliminate impediments to recovery through civil 
litigation.156 Even if the impediments to civil litigation are solved by Congress, 
only a limited number of victims are likely to have access to reparations 
through judicial means. Courts can only hear a small number of cases and the 
mere access to the legal system is extremely expensive. This is why President 
Obama also needs to work with Congress in order to create a truth commission 
that will recommend an administrative reparations program. This paper 
therefore suggests guidelines for the creation of a reparation program on the 
assumptions that a truth commission will have been instituted and that it 
recommended that such program take place.  
It has been argued that “truth commissions are sometimes not best 
equipped to make recommendations for reparation programs” because they 
oftentimes only receive a small amount of testimonies and cannot obtain 
independent evidence of the alleged violations.157 But this does not imply that 
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the truth commission will be responsible for the implementation of the 
reparations nor should it decide on the amount of compensation allocated in 
each case. In fact, the truth commission could be responsible for 
recommending the creation of a reparations fund or for setting the levels for 
reparations according to the violation.158 This, however, should not exclude 
from the eligibility of receiving such funds the victims who have not testified 
before the truth commission. 
Reparations can either be bestowed collectively or individually. Here, 
the reparations program should be individualized because, as the International 
Center for Transitional Justice argues, reparations underscore the importance 
of each human being that has suffered and recognize each individual as bearers 
of rights under international human rights law.159 Because most torture victims 
are not physically in the U.S., it would be virtually impossible to implement 
collective reparations. “However, this is not to say that there cannot be 
collective reparation of a symbolic nature, such as memorials in location of 
notorious prisons or monuments to the victims.”160 
In attempting to award individual reparations, the difficulty will most 
probably be for the eventual program to evaluate the amount of damages to 
which each individual is entitled. When assessing torture, there are subjective 
and objective factors to take into consideration. The objective factor is the 
treatment itself while the subjective factors are the characteristics of the victim, 
such as age, gender, cultural beliefs, and religion, among others.161 Thus, some 
treatments might amount to torture if inflicted on some persons but might not 
be considered as such if inflicted on others.162 An example from the “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” may be the insect placed in a confinement box if the 
detainee has a phobia of that insect.  
Thus, there is likely to be different degrees of suffering and long-term 
harm for each victim. The question is whether the reparations program “should 
make differentiations on an individual basis and recognize that some people 
have suffered more than others or simply agree on a lump sum for each person 
it considers to have been the victim of torture.”163 “In addressing this 
challenge, the Chilean Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture 
recognized as victims those people who could provide some evidence about 
their detention and simply presumed that most of them suffered torture, given 
the conditions of detention attested to unanimously by all the victims that did 
give testimony. Additionally, the Commission could not make distinctions 
among victims, because it was impossible to compare situations on an 
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objective basis.”164 Instead, it assumed that everyone who had been held in 
custody by officials under the mandate of Pinochet was subject to torture and, 
as such, awarded the same compensation to all.165 The advantage of having to 
make individual assessments about the level of harm suffered is that it will 
allow each victim to have his case decided on the basis of his own individual 
circumstances. The disadvantage is that it may be difficult for victims to show 
by independent means the extent of their injuries. In fact, since the victims 
were all detainees under the custody of the U.S. government, they were most 
likely all treated by medical doctors that also worked for the state, the 
“violator” of the rights. Clearly, victims will be able to testify about what 
happened, but it will be difficult to show their harm by independent means. 
Additionally, it is quite difficult to prove mental harm. A solution for this 
would be to make findings on a civil standard of proof, which requires the 
same access to information as the criminal standard.166 
A commentator suggests that a “scale of reparations should be set for 
various degrees of violations such as the amount of time someone has spent in 
custody and the type of abuse he has suffered.”167 Once the future commission 
makes a finding about a detainee that, for instance, he was tortured by being 
water-boarded and sexually assaulted on a few occasions, the program could 
“then apply the scale of reparation to determine how much that person is 
owed.”168 There are understandable problems with this method “in that it puts a 
monetary value on human rights violations.”169 This might be a value 
judgment, but “if the program can set up a framework with a monetary value 
for all types of violations then it will not only be easier to administer the 
reparations fund but also it will create some certainty for victims who will be 
able to know how much money they may be entitled to.”170  
Another contentious issue about the reparations program is its 
financing. Most countries that have implemented administrative reparations 
mechanisms after the commission of mass atrocities have been faced with this 
problem.171 Where should the state divert the money from? It is very likely that 
there may be opposition in the U.S. to diverting resources away from the 
population and social programs. In the end, the victims are or were alleged 
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terrorists. A similar situation occurred in Peru when the government had to 
comply with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decision in the 
Castro-Castro case.172 The victims were alleged terrorists from the sendero 
luminoso movement, and it has been said that the government was reluctant to 
comply with the reparations ordered by the court because of the contested 
nature of who the victims were. However, one way of dealing with this issue 
would be to give the truth commission power to seize assets of perpetrators or 
require them to pay damages, such as permitted by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).173 This would have the second aim of ensuring that perpetrators 
are held responsible for their actions. The ICC statute of course reflects a 
situation where someone has been found guilty of a crime before an 
international criminal court. That money could go into a common fund to be 
allocated by the truth commission in accordance with its findings regarding the 
victims. This however, also presents numerous problems. From whom exactly 
do you seize the assets? The military officer who was executing an order from 
the higher governmental officials? Former President Bush? The truth 
commission would therefore have to establish exactly who is accountable for 
the violations and to what extent they collaborated in the implementation of the 
policy of torture. 
The challenges to create such a reparations mechanism are great; 
however, the U.S. is not a poor country and does have the means to provide 
redress to the victims. The issue is whether there is political will to implement 
such a program. Civil society has, in this sense, a role to play. Citizens of the 
U.S. should pressure Congress and the Obama administration in order to see 
these recommendations realized. Because the U.S. is acting in such flagrant 
délit of its international human rights law obligations, it should have the 
audacity to redeem itself. 
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